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Newport, R.I.

The CINC and the Country Team:

Improving Cooperation to Meet the Challenges of Joint Operations

Submitted by

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Department of State

4 February 2002

A paper submitted to the faculty of the Naval War College in partial satisfaction of the requirements of the Joint Military Operations Department.

The contents of this paper reflect my own personal views and are not necessarily endorsed by the Naval War College or the Department of the Navy.

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INTRODUCTION

The United States enjoys unprecedented economic, political, and military power in the world today and this status both depends on and demands an active role in international affairs. Rapid advances in technology have increased the speed and scope of communications, enriching our lives but also raising our awareness of crises in every corner of globe. Our rivals, too, have learned to exploit this worldwide connectivity, and have used it to plan and coordinate attacks against us. The international scope of our marketplace, our extensive diplomatic and military presence, and the global reach of our culture and values bring hope and opportunity to many. But they also present convenient targets for the hatred of those who view our way of life as antithetical to their own.

In support of U.S. national interests throughout the world, it falls to the U.S. geographic combatant commander – the regional commander-in-chief (CINC) – to plan and implement military operations in his assigned area of the globe in order to confront these diverse challenges and fulfill the strategic goals set by our national leaders. But military strength is only one aspect of national power, and the CINC must also consider how best to combine the diplomatic, economic, and informational resources of the United States and its allies in the planning process.

The CINC must consider how best to integrate these elements in a coordinated interagency approach that will ensure unity of effort in the conduct of operations outside the United States. One way for the CINC to improve his operational effectiveness is by tapping into the knowledge and experience embodied in U.S. embassies abroad. Operating in 160 countries around the world, these forward-deployed representatives of over 30 U.S. Government agencies comprise each embassy's country team. Currently, however, coordination between the CINC and the country team is usually done on an ad hoc basis and often proves to be inadequate when

a crisis erupts.¹ This paper seeks to demonstrate the benefits of developing closer cooperation between the CINC and the country team and to propose a mechanism – a Country Team Advisory Committee (CTAC) – to facilitate and institutionalize that cooperation.

Recognizing the Need for Interagency Coordination

“Interagency coordination forges the vital link between the military instrument of power and the economic, political and/or diplomatic, and informational entities of the U.S. Government as well as nongovernmental agencies.”²

As former Chief of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General Henry Shelton recognized, “never before has the need for closer collaboration between military leaders and the diplomatic community been more crucial.”³ He added that although the U.S. military is 40 percent smaller than it was during the Cold War, it is deployed more frequently and almost always in ways that require close cooperation with civilian government agencies, foreign militaries, and nongovernmental organizations (NGOs).⁴ Since the tragic events of September 11th 2001, pressure has intensified to improve coordination and information exchange among military and civilian organizations to track terrorist networks that not only cross geographic boundaries, but utilize a complex web of connections ranging from the most sophisticated telecommunications to ancient systems of financial transactions. As the war on terrorism moves into the next phase after Afghanistan, close cooperation among the military, diplomatic, law enforcement, and intelligence communities is crucial. Collectively, they must find ways to identify remaining terrorist cells, enlist the support of foreign governments, and prevent the next act of terrorism.⁵

To meet the broad and diverse challenges to our national security that have emerged since the end of the Cold War, our national leaders have called upon military and civilian agencies to work together and pool their resources to provide the greatest degree of flexibility,

responsiveness, and unity of effort. At the strategic level, the need for greater joint cooperation has been highlighted in a series of Presidential Decision Directives on such issues as managing complex contingency operations, reforming multilateral peace operations, and combating terrorism.⁶ However, less attention has been directed to the issue of interagency cooperation at the operational level, where the CINC has the leading role.

The CINC as the Focal Point of Regional Interagency Cooperation

Joint doctrine designates the geographic combatant commander as “the focal point for planning and implementation of regional military strategies that require interagency coordination.”⁷ In order to develop such interagency coordination, the CINC must form an effective working relationship with the representatives of civilian agencies operating in his area of operations (AOR). However, there is no interagency structure at the regional level that is parallel to the geographic CINCs; instead the CINC must engage the interagency community at the operational-tactical level through the embassy country team.⁸

Joint doctrine encourages the CINC to communicate with ambassadors in his AOR, particularly as part of crisis action planning and military operations other than war (MOOTW) in which the Department of Defense (DOD) may not be the lead agency.⁹ However, joint doctrine does not specify how such communication should be effected, and approaches vary among the geographic commands:

- As head of U.S. Central Command from 1997 to 2000, General Anthony Zinni made it a priority to travel throughout his AOR, which stretches from Kazakhstan to Kenya. His presence helped build bilateral relations and raise the profile of the U.S. military in the

region, particularly in areas such as Central Asia where other high-ranking U.S. Government officials rarely visited.¹⁰

- Commander of U.S. Pacific Command (CINCPAC) Admiral Dennis Blair took an even more assertive approach to regional outreach. In April 2000, he visited Indonesia over the initial protests of the U.S. Ambassador there in order to forge closer ties with military leaders.¹¹ Blair, whose AOR encompasses 43 countries and 60 percent of the world's population, also extended his contacts to Russia, which is not currently assigned to any geographic command but has a significant impact on many surrounding countries.¹²
- The CINC of European Command (EUCOM), who is concurrently Supreme Allied Commander Europe under the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), faces specific obligations to make regular visits to each NATO country, and this requirement is being extended to countries that participate in the Partnership for Peace (PFP).¹³
- In U.S. Southern Command, in-country military representations tend to be less robust and focused on support to counternarcotics operations.¹⁴

With dozens of nations to cover and CINC headquarters sometimes separated from their AORs by thousands of miles, the CINC faces a daunting task in establishing substantive relationships in every country. In most cases, the CINC's focus is largely aimed at reinforcing alliances, developing new partnerships, engaging in joint exercises, and encouraging all manners of exchange with his foreign counterparts. Interaction with the U.S. Embassy country team in each location is often considered secondary to the bilateral mission. The CINC's contact with the country team might be limited to a general briefing of the sort given to most senior U.S. Government visitors, highlighting the most pressing issues, but providing little opportunity for

in-depth discussion or detailed exchange. Such was the case during CINCPAC's visit to Russia in July 2001, during which Admiral Blair's meeting with the country team of U.S. Embassy Moscow scarcely lasted 30 minutes and was held in an unclassified reception area, forcing country team representatives to be circumspect in their briefings and avoid sensitive comments for security reasons.¹⁵ While such visits are important for developing bilateral ties and increasing area familiarization, they do not always afford the opportunity to build a deeper foundation of cooperation between the embassy country team and the regional CINC.

Limitations of Interagency Representation at the CINC Level

One way in which CINCs have sought to expand their understanding of important issues outside the military realm is by augmenting their staff with representatives from other U.S. Government agencies. A senior State Department official is assigned as the CINC's Political Adviser or POLAD, and a senior intelligence officer is usually designated as the representative of the Director of Central Intelligence (DCI Rep). Other national agencies may also be represented on the CINC's staff, depending on the CINC's needs and area of focus. These officials serve to guide the CINC over sensitive political obstacles, keep him informed of relevant intelligence issues, and facilitate contact and coordination with their home agencies. They are likely to have substantive experience in the CINC's AOR, and probably have served in the region and/or developed expertise through long-term study and analysis.

The war on terrorism has increased the CINC's need for expertise in areas beyond the politico-military realm, such as international financial networks and law enforcement. To deal with these issues, some CINCs have proposed expanding their staffs to include representatives from the Treasury Department and the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI). In November

2001, General Richard B. Meyers, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, expressed support for the creation of interagency coordinating groups within the regional commands, creating, in effect, a localized version of the Washington policy community under the CINC's control. This proposal has met with resistance both from the potential contributing agencies, which contend that they do not have the manpower to spare, and within the DOD, where some fear that increasing the CINCs' power would ultimately undermine the authority of the Secretary of Defense.¹⁶

Interagency representatives play a crucial role in advising the CINC on a myriad of non-military issues and help the CINC integrate national policy objectives into the military planning process at the operational level. Despite their extensive experience, however, they cannot be experts on all countries within a CINC's AOR and their knowledge cannot be as current as those who live and work inside each country. In order to exploit the most current area knowledge on the broadest range of issues, the CINC needs to tap into the resources and expertise at the operational-tactical level of the embassy country teams.

Coordinating with the Country Team

Joint doctrine is replete with reminders that CINC and Joint Task Force (JTF) commanders need to coordinate with relevant country teams throughout foreign military operations.¹⁷ This is a lesson learned from past operations, particularly Operation Just Cause of December 1989 in Panama, in which civilian agencies were excluded from the planning process for security reasons.¹⁸ Yet in this case military planners assumed that the embassy would be ready to take on the lead role in working with the new government of Panama to restore civilian control shortly after hostilities ended.¹⁹ In fact, the embassy was not at all prepared for this

mission and the military had to devise an ad hoc mechanism – a military support group (MSG) – to help the new government get established in the post-hostilities environment.²⁰ As a result, transition to civilian control was complicated and protracted, leaving one commander to lament, “We know how to do joint operations with all the services, we know how to do combined operations with our allies, but how do we do interagency operations?”²¹

Since then, much more emphasis has been placed on the need for coordination with the country team, especially during crisis planning. For humanitarian assistance operations in particular, joint doctrine stresses the need to establish a Civilian-Military Operations Center (CMOC) to coordinate the efforts of military, civilian, NGO, and local government entities toward a comprehensive aid program. The CMOC concept proved its worth in Somalia, where it was termed “an effective, innovative mechanism not only for operational coordination but to bridge the gap between military and civilian perceptions,” according to the Presidential envoy in Somalia, Ambassador Robert Oakley.²²

Once a JTF has been formed for a specific operation, joint doctrine outlines several other organizational tools for interagency coordination, including:

- Liaison Teams to serve as “the focal point for communication with external agencies and the host-nation government;”
- Executive Steering Groups, composed of principals from the JTF, the embassy, NGOs, and other organizations as appropriate;
- Humanitarian Operations Centers to coordinate overall relief efforts, and
- numerous other interagency working groups to coordinate logistics, intelligence support, media relations, etc.²³

As the above examples illustrate, the U.S. military has devised numerous ways to address the need for interagency coordination at the operational-tactical level. However, in most cases, there is no similarly comprehensive organizational approach among the interagency representatives of the country team. Thus when a CINC endeavors to integrate all elements of national power in planning and implementing operations, he may encounter a country team that is unprepared to provide a reciprocal level of support and coordination.

A CINC does have the advantage of coordinating with the embassy through DOD representatives in the Defense Attache Office (DAO) and/or Security Assistance Organization (SAO). Since the end of the Cold War, the role of defense attaches has expanded and diversified to include not only reporting on host-country defense-related issues, but managing all aspects of military-to-military exchange and cooperation. In addition to the bilateral military relationship, military attaches are responsible for keeping the chief of mission fully informed on all defense and security policy matters.²⁴ The SAO in particular, though he reports to the ambassador, is rated by the regional CINC, thus making the SAO the regional commander's most direct line of contact with the embassy.²⁵

While they support the CINC in bilateral military relations, DOD representatives do not usually delve into other areas of the embassy's mission and may not be fully aware of the full range of political/diplomatic, economic, and informational aspects of foreign policy being conducted by the various elements of the embassy staff. In order to utilize all elements of the interagency community at the embassy level most effectively, the CINC needs the full support of the ambassador and needs to engage all the members of the country team.

A Look at the Workings of the Country Team

While country teams in the smallest U.S. embassies may consist of no more than a handful of officers, embassy staffs today are becoming increasingly diverse, some containing representatives from over 30 U.S. Government agencies. Despite the ever-present battle for personnel and resources, more and more agencies are expanding their overseas presence, reflecting the global nature of U.S. national interests across the full spectrum of political, economic, and security issues. Joining traditional overseas operations such as the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) and the Foreign Commercial Service (FCS), more recent additions include, inter alia, the Department of Energy, Secret Service, Customs Service, Treasury Department, and the FBI, which now maintains 44 Legal Attache offices abroad.

Not only does each agency bring its particular perspective to the country team, but each also develops contacts with counterpart agencies and organizations in the host-country government and community, thus expanding the embassy's collective scope. No two embassies are comprised of exactly the same mix of agencies, but each presents a unique pool of resources filled with experts in many fields who share the common goal of better understanding the country in which they serve. By tapping into the country team, the CINC can access these interagency resources without encumbering his staff with additional personnel or calling upon other agencies to contribute their own scarce personnel resources.

But while a country team offers the potential to engage the broad capabilities of the interagency community, the country team itself is not necessarily designed or organized to meet the needs of the CINC and his staff. The embassy does not have an equivalent of a J-5 planning group that focuses on bringing all elements of the embassy's resources together in a comprehensive plan on any particular issue. While the ambassador provides overall guidance

and direction for the embassy, agency representatives continue to receive instructions from their home offices.²⁶ Regular country team meetings provide a forum for agency and section heads to update the ambassador and each other on their activities, but generally do not conduct the kind of detailed, comprehensive planning that is familiar to CINCs and their staffs.

Embassy Working Groups: Vehicles for Interagency Coordination

Often it takes a crisis or some other high profile event to spur the various embassy sections to seek out their neighbors and share information across agency lines. When the need for an interagency approach is especially acute, the ambassador may elect to form a working group within the embassy – a subset of the country team – to focus on a specific issue and encourage unity of effort. Some embassies form standing working groups, for example, on law enforcement or narcotics issues bringing together DEA, FBI, Customs, Treasury, State and other concerned agencies. In a country with a significant refugee population, the ambassador might direct his refugee coordinator (usually a State Department officer) to form a working group to include other embassy elements, such as USAID and the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS), as well as local NGO's and host-government agencies with responsibility for the issue. (See Annex A-B for examples of embassy working groups in action.)

One working group found in all embassies is the Emergency Action Committee (EAC), which brings together security, law enforcement, military, political, administrative, and other country team elements to plan for unexpected events that might adversely affect embassy personnel and American expatriates in the country. The EAC is required to produce a plan for such emergencies, and to update the plan on a semi-annual basis.²⁷ The Emergency Action Plan (EAP) may be the closest thing to what military personnel would recognize as a contingency

plan and may be particularly useful in case of noncombatant evacuation operations (NEO). Joint doctrine recommends the EAP as “an invaluable resource”²⁸ for combatant commanders, but its usefulness is limited in that its focus is more on protecting U.S. citizens and facilities in-country than on deploying U.S. forces in response to a crisis.

Thus while embassy working groups can be useful in fostering interagency coordination on specific issues, there is no permanent working group established to focus on issues of concern to the CINC and to channel input from an interagency perspective into the CINC’s planning process. The DAO/SAO, while serving a vital liaison function between the CINC and the country team, does not have the resources or the institutional platform to address this need alone.

Bridging the Gap Between the CINC and the Country Team

One way to help bridge the gap between the CINC and the country team would be to create a new working group, operating in peacetime as well as during crises or hostilities, to provide a working-level channel to exchange information, improve mutual understanding, and foster interagency unity of effort at the operational-tactical level. The mechanism proposed here – a Country Team Advisory Committee, or CTAC – would create a permanent working relationship between the CINC and the country team that would become institutionalized as part of the interagency process in planning and executing foreign operations.

The CTAC in Peacetime: The purpose of the CTAC during peacetime would be to foster better understanding of the respective roles, capabilities, and responsibilities of the CINC and the country team with the aim of improving operational planning. The CTAC would provide a forum to exchange ideas, dispel myths and mistaken assumptions, and break down civil-military

cultural barriers. At the initial meetings and as often as possible thereafter, a member of the CINC staff, particularly from the J-5 planning staff, should attend CTAC meetings to facilitate this exchange. At other times, the SAO, as the CINC's representative, could take the lead.

Once a sound basis of understanding has been established, the CTAC could focus on pertinent regional issues that might require interagency attention in the future, such as potential border disputes or looming humanitarian crises. As a starting point, the CTAC might review the embassy's Emergency Action Plan to assess its effectiveness and clarify assumptions about how the CINC and the embassy would work together in the event of a crisis. Such exchanges through the CTAC during peacetime should help lay the groundwork for more effective cooperation between the embassy and the CINC or JTF commander in the event of an actual crisis.

The CTAC During a Crisis:

Early in crisis action planning for operations outside the continental United States and its territories, the geographic combatant commander communicates with the appropriate ambassadors as part of crisis assessment. The ambassador and country team are often aware of factors and considerations that the geographic combatant commanders might apply to develop courses of action and they are key to bringing together U.S. national resources within the host country.²⁹

During a crisis in which the CINC deploys U.S. military assets in theater, the ambassador will most likely want to convene the CTAC more frequently in order to assess the security situation inside the country and channel vital information to military planners. Hopefully, the CTAC will have been established before the crisis breaks out so that its members will have already formed an effective working relationship and will be able to develop a quicker, more comprehensive assessment of the situation at hand. In the event that the U.S. ambassador is withdrawn as a diplomatic sign of protest during a crisis, as happened during U.S. operations in

Haiti in 1994, the CTAC will be able to maintain continuity, relying on the internal cohesion and pattern of cooperation already established among its members.

As the crisis develops, the CTAC will become the focal point for coordinating and drafting situation reports incorporating information obtained by all members of the interagency community. While the embassy's administrative and consular sections update the committee on plans for evacuation of U.S. embassy staff and expatriates, the political section might review efforts to get the host government to accept a United Nations resolution on the crisis. While the Treasury representative reports on a possible financial collapse brought on by the crisis, the USAID representative might discuss the status of NGO's efforts to cope with the flow of refugees. While the FBI reviews efforts by local police and security officials to maintain order in the capital, the Department of Energy representative might outline host government plans to protect the nation's nuclear power stations. All agencies and sections would report and coordinate their plans and progress in the CTAC.

If the crisis is in a neighboring state or region, the CTAC might focus on gaining host country support for a military coalition, exchanging intelligence information, and securing relief aid or providing temporary shelter for victims of the crisis. To perform these tasks, CTAC members will call upon their full range of contacts among government officials, police and security organs, business leaders, the media, NGO's, and others. By coordinating and reporting jointly, the CTAC can give both the CINC and Washington policymakers the broadest view of the impact of the crisis. If the crisis deepens and it becomes necessary to evacuate all embassy personnel, members of the CTAC might make excellent additions to a JTF staff or National Intelligence Support Team (NIST).

The CTAC in the Post-crisis Environment: Once hostilities have ended or the main impact of the crisis has passed, the CINC faces the complex challenge of disengaging military forces and returning the country to civilian control. The CTAC can be the focal point of this transition, bridging the gap between military leaders and host-government officials. As CTAC members reestablish contacts throughout the host government, they can resume reporting on such issues as critical shortages, status of infrastructure, and revival of trade and commerce.

The CTAC can also serve as a crucial link between the military forces preparing to pull out of the country and the NGOs and relief organizations that will continue their efforts after the last soldier has departed. If U.S. forces are to remain in-country for an extended period of time, an effort should be made to have military representatives attend CTAC meetings and arrange visits to local bases for CTAC members, again with the aim of breaking down cultural barriers, increasing familiarity, and improving interagency cooperation.

Counterterrorism and Coalition Building: In confronting the particular challenges of the war on terrorism, U.S. national leaders have vowed to employ every tool available: military, legal, financial, diplomatic, and intelligence.³⁰ They have also determined that the support of other countries will be crucial in order to track terrorists and their support networks across the globe. Such an effort will require an unprecedented level of coordinated interagency effort at every level, including among U.S. Government representatives working overseas. The CTAC can help the CINC explore and consider non-military courses of action to get at terrorist cells through financial networks, business ties, charitable organizations, training centers, etc. Through CTAC members' contacts with the host-government and community leaders, the CINC can

pursue areas of non-military coalition support; for example, building ties to law enforcement, border control, trade and customs officials, political opposition groups, and many others.

As the war on terrorism extends beyond Afghanistan, CINCs must devise new plans and develop effective working relationships with foreign governments without compromising or diluting the mission. Working with a CTAC can help expand the CINC's options and formulate more focused and realistic plans for rooting out terrorists wherever they may be.

Standing up the CTAC

In order to set the tone for developing cooperative relations and to introduce the CTAC concept, the CINC should consider hosting a conference at his headquarters for all the ambassadors in his region, or groups of ambassadors if the total number is too large to accommodate them all at once. At this conference, the CINC and his staff could provide an overview of the military planning process, describing both deliberate and crisis planning, and explain how a CTAC can provide a crucial channel to coordinate and exchange valuable information between the CINC and the embassy. The ambassadors, in turn, should brief the CINC on the composition of their embassies, describing the various U.S. Government agencies represented in-country, their primary responsibilities, and current priority issues. The CINC should also introduce the members of his staff who will be primarily responsible for coordinating with the CTAC once established in each embassy.

As a follow-up to the CINC-hosted conference, the CINC should send members of his staff, most likely from the J-5 planning element, on a regional tour of countries in the CINC's AOR. The initial meeting at each embassy should serve to introduce the CTAC concept to the country team and describe how the interagency community at the embassy can support the

CINC's planning process. While the ambassador should oversee the CTAC, he or she may want to delegate day-to-day administrative responsibilities to the SAO (or DAO as appropriate). The SAO could also be responsible for arranging visits by J-5 representatives to attend CTAC meetings and coordinating the meetings within the embassy.

Once the CTAC has been established and its members have a general understanding of the regional role of the CINC and how his command operates, the CTAC need only meet periodically – perhaps quarterly or twice a year. These periodic meetings should serve to keep members apprised of the CINC's current priorities, allow for discussion of local issues of concern, and maintain familiarity among CTAC members as personnel come and go at the embassy. The ambassador need not attend such routine meetings, and the SAO can take the lead in organizing the group and setting the agenda. At each meeting, the SAO might bring questions or requests for information relayed by the CINC staff and use these points to generate discussion and exchange of information within the CTAC.

The SAO should also keep CTAC members apprised of any upcoming visits to the area by the CINC and his staff. If combined exercises are planned with local military elements, CTAC members might be invited to attend as observers. Such exposure can help foster better understanding across military and civilian lines and facilitate support in the event of actual deployment of military forces. Consideration might also be given to incorporating the CTAC into war-gaming exercises, to add a realistic element and develop better communications and cooperation between military and civilian participants.

CONCLUSION

Regional combatant commanders today face an ever-increasing variety of threats and challenges that demand a wide range of responses from traditional uses of military force to special operations and from noncombatant evacuations to humanitarian assistance. To perform their mission most effectively, CINCs need access to the most current and accurate information available across a wide spectrum of military, political, economic, and social issues in their operating areas. CINCs are also called upon to incorporate all elements of national power in their plans, integrating the capabilities of diplomatic, law enforcement, intelligence, public affairs, and aid agencies into their plans.

To achieve unity of effort across civilian and military lines, CINCs need to work closely with embassy country teams in order to maximize interagency coordination at the operational-tactical level. The CINC should work with the ambassadors in each country of his AOR to encourage the formation of a working group at each embassy to focus on issues of concern to the CINC and incorporate the expertise of the country team into the CINC's planning process. Toward that end, CINCs should encourage the development of Country Team Advisory Committees – CTACs; working groups specifically designed to establish a permanent channel for coordination and exchange of information between the CINC and the country team.

The CTAC can help bridge the gap between the CINC and the country team and help each side understand the needs, capabilities, and limitations of the other. Creation of CTACs during peacetime can help establish a foundation of cooperation and understanding on which to build a stronger and more efficient working relationship in the event of a crisis. The challenges facing our nation today demand that such an opportunity to foster truly joint unity of effort should not be overlooked.

ANNEX A:

Coping with an Emerging Crisis: Economic Collapse in Russia

On 17 August 1998, Russia Prime Minister Sergey Kiriyenko declared a moratorium on payment of all debts, foreign and domestic, and announced that Russia would drastically devalue its currency. The ensuing financial crisis was exacerbated by the potentially explosive situation among government workers, military personnel, and retirees, whose wages and pensions had not been paid for as much as a year, and by a president whose lingering illness kept him out of the public eye for weeks on end. In the days following the precipitous announcement, banks closed and store shelves were wiped clean by those lucky enough to have cash on hand, while soldiers and pensioners took to the fields to glean any potatoes left over from the meager harvest.

In view of the crisis and the prospect of widespread unrest, the U.S. Embassy in Moscow convened an ad hoc committee to report on the situation, drawing on the diverse interagency community represented in-country. In daily meetings, the embassy working group compiled reports from representatives of such diverse organizations as the Foreign Agricultural Service, who reported on the state of the harvest from contacts across the country; the Peace Corps, whose volunteers kept in touch with their Moscow-based coordinator by e-mail and gave assessments of the situation in their remote locations; the Customs Service, who reported on problems of imports and exports being held up at the borders; the Department of Energy, who reported on the state of nuclear facilities, whose workers were among those with long-overdue wages; and the Defense Attache Office, who monitored movements of military and internal security forces, watching for signs of unusual deployments. Many other members of the embassy community provided observations and insights from their Russian contacts.

All of these reports and observations were compiled into a single daily cable, which was distributed widely to the U.S. Government community in Washington and at missions abroad. The product proved so popular that the Embassy's Economic Section, responsible for compiling the daily report, was compelled to fax an advance draft to Washington policymakers in time for early morning meetings each day.

This experience illustrates how, even in the time of CNN and instant messaging, there is no substitute for hands-on, eye-witness reporting by experienced and knowledgeable observers who have policymakers' concerns in mind. An interagency effort that might have taken days or weeks to coordinate in the Washington environment was accomplished with minimal bureaucratic fuss and maximum cooperation, successfully fulfilling the crucial task of telling policymakers what they needed to know in a concise, timely format.¹

ANNEX B:

Anticipating a Crisis: Planning for Y2K in Russia

Another example of a contingency that spanned civilian and military areas of responsibility was the concern over potential problems associated with the end of the millennium and transition to the year 2000, known colloquially as Y2K. In Russia, some observers predicted a possible catastrophe involving everything from the collapse of electricity grids to the accidental launch of ballistic missiles. U.S. Ambassador to Russia James F. Collins was called upon to provide assessments of whether the Russian Government was prepared to meet the challenges of Y2K. To meet this challenge, Ambassador Collins directed that a working group be formed comprising various members of the country team. The effort was led by the Counselor for

¹ Author participated in the working groups described in Annex A and B while serving at U.S. Embassy Moscow, July 1998-July 2001.

Environment, Science and Technology (EST), a State Department officer, and drew on the diverse resources of the country team. For example:

- The Treasury Department representative reported on efforts of Russian and foreign banks to anticipate and fix any glitches in the financial sector;
- The director of the Peace Corps office contacted American volunteers across the Russian hinterland and developed contingency plans in the event that they had to be evacuated;
- A Foreign Commercial Service representative reported on how local businesses were preparing for the possible crisis, and
- The Defense Attache's Office facilitated an unprecedented exchange of U.S. and Russian military personnel to monitor each other's ballistic missiles during the Y2K turnover.

The Embassy's Y2K working group created a nexus for reporting on Y2K issues to which all members of the country team contributed, drawing on diverse contacts throughout the Russian Government, private sector, and expatriate community. The EST Counselor prepared reporting cables based on contributions from all members of the working group and disseminated these cables throughout the Washington policymaking community. The working group reports were also drawn upon by individual members of the country team in preparing more specific reports for their home agencies. U.S. Embassy Moscow's Y2K working group is an example of how an embassy country team is uniquely able to pool resources, cutting across interagency rivalries and cultural biases, to form a comprehensive, multi-faceted approach on a specific issue.

ENDNOTES

¹ U.S. Joint Chiefs Staff, Interagency Coordination During Joint Operations, Joint Publication 3-08, Vol. I, (U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington D.C., 9 October 1996), II-16.

² Ibid., v (executive summary).

³ Henry H. Shelton, "From the Chairman; The U.S. Military and Foreign Policy," Harvard International Review, Vol. XX, No.1, Winter 1997/1998, 77-78.

⁴ Ibid.

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⁶ Presidential Decision Directives (PDD) 25 – Reforming Multilateral Peace Operations; PDD 56 – Managing Complex Contingency Operations; PDD 39 – U.S. Policy on Counterterrorism; PDD 62 – Combating Terrorism; Federation of American Scientists, Intelligence Resource Program, website: <<http://fas.org/irp/offdocs/pdd>> [20 December 2001].

⁷ JP 3-08, vii.

⁸ Ibid., Figure I-1, I-6.

⁹ Ibid., x; U.S. Joint Chiefs Staff, Doctrine for Joint Operations, Joint Publication 3-0, (U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington D.C., 10 September 2001), V-1.

¹⁰ Dana Priest, "An Engagement in 10 Time Zones; Zinni Crosses Central Asia, Holding Hands, Building Trust," The Washington Post, 29 September 2000, A18

¹¹ Dana Priest, "Standing Up to State and Congress," The Washington Post, 30 September 2000, A01

¹² Anatoliy Medetsky, "U.S., Russian Admirals Strike Hopeful Chord," Vladivostok Daily, 21 June 2001.

¹³ Website for U.S. European Command, <www.eucom.mil>, [27 December 2001];

¹⁴ Dana Priest, "A Four-Star Foreign Policy?; U.S. Commanders Wield Rising Clout, Autonomy," The Washington Post, 28 September 2000, A01

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¹⁶ Eric Schmitt, "Four Commanders Seek Staff Role for the FBI," The New York Times, 20 November 2001.

¹⁷ JP 3-08.

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¹⁹ Ibid., 17

²⁰ Ibid., 39

²¹ General George A. Joulwan, quoted in Ibid., 65.

²² JP 3-08, III-16

²³ Ibid., III-19-26

²⁴ Colonel David Potts, USAF, "The Rise of Military Diplomacy: New Roles for the Defense Attache," Foreign Area Officer Association Journal (electronic version), <www.faoa.org/journal> [20 December 2001].

²⁵ JP 3-08, II-16.

²⁶ Ibid.

²⁷ JP 3-08, II-14.

²⁸ Ibid.

²⁹ JP 3-0, 50.

³⁰ Dan Balz and Bob Woodward, "10 Days in September, Part 1, America's Chaotic Road to War: Bush's Global Strategy Began to Take Shape in First Frantic Hours After Attack," The Washington Post, 27 January 2001, A01.

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